Stopping the Practice of Authorized Generics: Maylan\u27s Effort to Close the Gaping Black Hole in the Hatch-Waxman Act by Porter, Brian
Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) 
Volume 22 Issue 1 Article 7 
2005 
Stopping the Practice of Authorized Generics: Maylan's Effort to 
Close the Gaping Black Hole in the Hatch-Waxman Act 
Brian Porter 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp 
Recommended Citation 
Brian Porter, Stopping the Practice of Authorized Generics: Maylan's Effort to Close the Gaping Black Hole 
in the Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 177 (2006). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp/vol22/iss1/7 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) by an authorized editor of CUA 
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
STOPPING THE PRACTICE OF AUTHORIZED
GENERICS: MYLAN'S EFFORT TO CLOSE THE
GAPING BLACK HOLE IN THE HATCH-WAXMAN
ACT
Brian Porter
Since the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act' in 1984, brand name drug
manufacturers have found many ways to use the provisions of the Hatch-
2Waxman Act to protect patented new drugs from generic competition.
Using these provisions, brand name manufacturers have employed delay
tactics and executed anti-competitive agreements with generic manufacturers
in order to prevent generic manufacturers from entering the market.
3
Although Congress, the FDA, and the courts have taken action to prevent
brand name manufacturers from abusing the provisions of the Hatch-
Waxman Act, brand name manufacturers have continued to find ways to do
so.
Most recently, brand name manufacturers have marketed generic versions
of their own patented drugs in order to prevent generic manufacturers from
taking a large share of their market. These generic versions of brand name
manufacturers' patented drugs are called "authorized generics." An
authorized generic is chemically the same drug as the brand name
J.D. 2005, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. The author
wishes to thank Richard M. Volin for his guidance, the editors and staff of the Journal for
all of their hard work, and his family for their love and support over the years.
1. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 35 U.S.C.). The provisions of the act are referred
to as the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
2. See generally William Shieber, One View From the Road: State Antitrust
Enforcement in Pharmaceutical Cases, 18 ANTITRUST 74, 75 (2004); see also The
Stalling Game: Sweetheart deals and patent extensions keep lower-cost generic drugs
from consumers, CONSUMER REPORTS, Jan. 27, 1999, available at
http://www.consumerreports.org/main/detail.jsp?CONTENT%3C%3Ecnt id=1 13229&F
OLDER%3C%3Efolderid=21135&bmUlID=1006897854369 (last visited Aug. 18,
2005) [hereinafter The Stalling Game].
3. See Shieber, supra note 2, at 75; The Stalling Game, supra note 2.
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manufacturer's patented drug, but is relabeled and sold at a lower price like
other generic versions of the patented drug.4
Authorized generics represent a new and unexplored area in the world of
brand name and generic drugs. Indeed, Congress has not specifically
addressed the issue since the Hatch-Waxman Act's inception, and only one
court has ruled on the issue.5 However, this problem should be addressed
soon. As one judge has stated in a case involving Mylan Pharmaceuticals
Inc. ("Mylan"), a generic manufacturer, and the Federal Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA"), a government agency responsible for
pharmaceutical approval, authorized generics have exposed a "gaping black
hole" in the Hatch-Waxman Act.
6
Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 in an effort to promote
innovation and competition in the pharmaceutical industry.7  This Act
attempted to strike a balance between allowing brand name drug
manufacturers to bring new drugs to the market with patent protection and
allowing generic manufacturers to compete with brand name manufacturers
by marketing generic copies of the new drugs.8 In addition, Congress sought
to make lower-priced generic drugs available to the public as an alternative
to higher-priced brand name drugs.
9
Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ( "FDCA"), when a
brand name drug manufacturer intends to market a new drug, it must submit
a new drug application ("NDA") to the FDA for review. 10 The FDA review
of the NDA primarily determines: (1) whether the drug is safe and effective;
4. See Christopher Worrell, The 5th Generic Drugs Summit: Authorized Generics
(Sept. 27-29, 2004), http://www.iirusa.com/genericsummit/files/IIR_P1016 Worrell.pdf.
5. See generally Teva Pharm., Indus., Ltd. v. FDA, 355 F. Supp. 2d 111, 118
(D.D.C. 2004).
6. Vicki Smith, Associated Press, Mylan Lawsuit Warns of Looming Threat to
Generic Drug Industry, PHILLYBURBS.COM, Aug. 27, 2004, http://www.phillyburbs.
com/pb-dyn/news/1 03-08272004-356195.html.
7. Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act:
History, Structure and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 585 (2003); see also H.R. REP.
No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686.
8. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 7, at 590; see also H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 2,
at 4 (1984); Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stating that
"[t]he Act emerged from Congress' efforts to balance two conflicting policy objectives:
to induce name-brand pharmaceutical firms to make the investments necessary to
research and develop new drug products, while simultaneously enabling competitors to
bring cheaper, generic copies of those drugs to market").
9. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984).
10. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FDA, NEW DRUG APPLICATION
(NDA) PROCESS (2003), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/applications/
nda.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
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(2) whether the package labeling is appropriate; and (3) whether the methods
used to manufacture the drug "are adequate to preserve the drug's identity,
strength, quality, and purity."'' I The brand name manufacturer must include
in its NDA the drug's patent number and its expiration date, each of which is
published by the FDA in the Orange Book. 12 The Orange Book identifies
and lists FDA approved drugs and provides details of their safety and
effectiveness. 
13
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, a generic manufacturer can begin
experimenting on a patented drug before its expiration and seek to market a
generic version of the patented drug through the Abbreviated New Drug
Application ("ANDA") process.14 Through the ANDA process, which will
be described more fully in Part I, Section A of this comment, a generic
manufacturer is able to rely on the safety and efficacy data of a patented
drug and then manufacture and sell a generic version of the patented drug.
15
The ANDA process allows for generic manufacturers to "piggyback on the
proprietary safety and effectiveness data submitted by the innovator to
obtain approval from the [FDA] for the pioneer drug. ' 6  The Hatch-
Waxman Act "substantially relax[ed] the testing requirements imposed on
generic manufacturers" in order to create competition in the drug market.
17
By permitting generic companies to avoid developing safety and efficacy
data, these companies can spend significantly less money on research and
11. Id.
12. Erika King Lietzan, A Brief History of 180-Day Exclusivity Under the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 59 FOOD DRUG L.J.
287, 287 (2004). The "Orange Book" is the common reference name for the publication
Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, and it is updated
monthly. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FDA, APPROVED DRUG
PRODUCTS WITH THERAPUETIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (2005), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/docs/preface/ecpreface.htm. (last visited Aug. 28, 2005).
13. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH
THERAPUETIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS, supra note 12.
14. Teresa 0. Bittenbender & John W. Ryan, Recent Developments in
Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 16 NO. 9 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 5, 5 (2004).
15. GARY J. BUEHLER, CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, FDA, THE FDA
PROCESS FOR APPROVING GENERIC DRUGS 5 (2002), available at http://www.fda.gov/
cder/ogd/02- 10 BCBSgjb/sldOO I.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
16. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 7, at 585-86 (stating additionally that this
process enables "generic manufacturers to avoid the costly and lengthy process of
developing data establishing the safety and efficacy of their drugs and to obtain FDA
approval merely by showing their drugs to be the 'same' as, and 'bioequivalent' to, the
listed drug").
17. Id. at 590.
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development, enabling them to develop and market a "lower cost alternative
to brand-name drugs."'
18
To promote competition, the Hatch-Waxman Act gives the first generic
manufacturer who files an ANDA with the FDA a 180-day period of
exclusivity to market their generic version of the pioneer drug. 9 During the
180-day exclusivity period, the generic copy is the only generic version of
the pioneer drug allowed on the market. 20 The 180-day exclusivity period
can be utilized through the "commercial-marketing trigger"2 1 of the Hatch-
Waxman Act, in which the period of exclusivity is "triggered" when the
22generic manufacturer first begins marketing its generic version. The
Hatch-Waxman Act also has a "court-decision trigger" for the 180-day
exclusivity period. The court-decision trigger has been subject to a great
deal of dispute in the federal courts since the Hatch-Waxman Act's
enactment. 24 Much of the dispute has involved FDA regulations interpreting
the court-decision trigger to require generic manufacturers to successfully
defend against patent infringement suits by the brand name manufacturers
who patented the pioneer drugs, thereby making it more difficult to obtain
the 180 days of exclusivity. Federal courts have stricken some these
regulations, 6 and in 2003, Congress practically eliminated the court-
decision trigger, making the commercial-marketing trigger the primary
27trigger for the 180-day exclusivity period.
In addition to striking down FDA regulations that have made it more
difficult for a generic manufacturer to utilize the 180-day exclusivity period,
courts have also had to deal with brand name manufacturers who have
18. Carrie Stewart Martin, Providing Inducement of Infringement of Method-of-Use
Patents in Hatch-Waxman Act Litigation: Are the Standards Realistic for the
Pharmaceutical Industry?, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 163, 168-69 (2004).
19. See Lietzan, supra note 12, at 288.
20. See id.; see also David A. Balto, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The
Antitrust Risks, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 321, 331 (2000).
21. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) (2000).
22. Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1998). In its
proposed regulations implementing the Hatch-Waxman Act, the FDA defined
'commercial marketing" as "the first date of introduction or delivery for introduction into
interstate commerce outside the control of the manufacturer." 54 Fed. Reg. 28,872,
28,895 (proposed Jul. 10, 1989)(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 10, 310, 314, 320).
23. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(1I)(2000).
24. See generally Lietzan, supra note 12, at 294-3 10.
25. See generally id. at 296-300.
26. See Mova, 140 F.3d 1060; Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Friedman, 162 F.3d 1201 (D.C.
Cir. 1998).
27. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see
also Lietzan, supra note 12, at 310.
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engaged in anti-competitive conduct. Although the Hatch-Waxman Act was
enacted to promote competition by making it easier for generic
manufacturers to obtain approval of their generics and rewarding them with
the 180-day exclusivity period, brand name manufacturers have been finding
ways to prevent generic manufacturers from coming to the market.28 For
example, because the first generic ANDA applicant is entitled to 180 days of
exclusivity without competition from other generic competition, some brand
name manufacturers have paid the first generic ANDA applicants to not sell
their generic version during the period, allowing the brand name
manufacturers to continue reaping monopoly profits.
29
In addition, some brand name manufacturers have used delay tactics, such
as filing a citizen petition30 requesting the FDA not to approve the generic
manufacturer's ANDA. 31 This tactic has been effective, because anytime "a
citizen petition is filed, the FDA places a hold on approval of the generic
while it investigates the complaint.
' 32
Another delay tactic used by brand name manufacturers is submitting new
patents to the FDA, which are similar to an old patent that is about to
expire. After the new patent is listed in the Orange Book, a brand name
manufacturer would argue that the sale of a generic version of the old
patented drug would violate the patent on the new listed drug.34 This would
28. Shieber, supra note 2, at 75.
29. Id.
30. Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000) and 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2005), a citizen
petition to the FDA is a petition requesting the Commissioner of the FDA to: (1) issue,
amend, or revoke a regulation or proposed regulation; (2) issue, amend, or revoke an
order or proposed order; or (3) take or refrain from taking administrative action. FDA,
CITIZEN PETITION (1996), available at http://www.fda.gov/opacom/morechoices/
smallbusiness/citizpet.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2005).
31. The Stalling Game, supra note 2.
32. Id.
33. See Shieber, supra note 2, at 75. The Hatch-Waxman Act's thirty-month stay
provision has allowed brand name manufacturers to delay a generic manufacturer's
coming to market by listing additional patents of doubtful validity in the Orange Book.
Id. This is because every time a generic manufacturer submits an ANDA that infringes
upon a listed patent, the generic manufacturer must provide notice of its ANDA to the
brand name manufacturer. Id. When this notice is given, the brand name manufacturer
has forty-five days after receiving notice to sue the generic manufacturer for patent
infringement. An automatic thirty-month stay of approval of the ANDA by the FDA then
takes effect. Id. See also The Stalling Game, supra note 2; In re Buspirone Patent &
Antitrust Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 340, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
34. See In re Buspirone, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 343.
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delay the approval of the generic manufacturer's ANDA, allowing a brand
name manufacturer to continue reaping monopoly profits.
35
Although courts have invalidated many of the attempts by brand name
manufacturers to prevent generic competition,36 brand name manufacturers
have continued to find ways to do so. Over the past few years, many brand
name manufacturers have been creating generic versions of their own drugs
and marketing these generic versions in order to reduce competition from
generic manufacturers. These generic versions are called "authorized
generics." An authorized generic is essentially the same drug as the brand
name manufacturer's FDA-approved pioneer drug, or approved NDA, and it
is "then relabeled and marketed under the generic product name" and sold at
a lower price. 37 The authorized generic is manufactured by the brand name
manufacturer, but it is distributed through a licensee, who packages the drug
with its own label and NDC number. Generic manufacturers and others
have opposed the marketing and sale of authorized generics, claiming that
brand name manufacturers are "trying to retain crucial market share through
partnerships for authorized generic versions of their products."
39
35. See Shieber, supra note 2, at 75.
36. See, e.g., In re Buspirone, 185 F. Supp. 2d; In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 338 F.
Supp. 2d 517 (D. N.J. 2004).
37. Worrell, supra note 4. The FDA defines "authorized generic" as "any marketing
by an NDA holder or authorized by an NDA holder, including through a third-party
distributor, of the drug product approved under the NDA in a manner equivalent to the
marketing practices of holders of an approved ANDA for that drug." Letter from
William K. Hubbard, Associate Commissioner for Policy and Planning, FDA, to Stuart
A. Williams, Chief Legal Officer, Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and James N. Czaban,
Heller Ehrman, at 2 n. 2 (Jul. 2, 2004) (on file with the author) [hereinafter FDA
Response to Mylan Citizen Petition]. Mylan defines "authorized generic" as "at term of
art commonly used in the pharmaceutical industry to describe a drug product, which is a
private label version of a brand name product supplied by the brand company." Letter
from Stuart A. Williams, Chief Legal Officer, Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., to Dockets
Management Branch, FDA, at 2 (Feb. 17, 2004) (on file with the author) [hereinafter
Mylan Citizen Petition] (requesting that "the FDA [] prohibit the marketing and
distribution of 'Authorized Generics' until the expiration of the first generic applicant's
exclusivity period").
38. Mylan Citizen Petition, supra note 37, at 3. NDC refers to the National Drug
Code Directory for prescription and a few selected over the counter ("OTC") drugs. The
NDC number, a 10 digit, 3-segment number, allows for drugs to be identified in the
directory. FDA, INTERNET NDC DIRECTORY (2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/
cder/ndc/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
39. Steve Niles, Strike Against Generics: Marketing Authorized Generic
Formulations of Their Products Through Partnerships With Generic Companies Can
Help Branded Pharmaceutical Companies Hold on to Market Share, But These
Agreements Have Raised the Ire of Some in the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry as They
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On February 17, 2004, Mylan, a manufacturer and distributor of generic
drugs,n° filed a citizen petition with the FDA requesting that the FDA
prohibit brand name manufacturers from marketing and distributing
authorized generics until the end of the first generic ANDA applicant's 180-
day exclusivity period.4 ' Mylan claimed that authorized generics are the
same as other generic versions of the pioneer drug because they are similarly
priced and compete directly with other "true" generic versions of the pioneer
drug.42 Therefore, Mylan argued that brand name manufacturers should not
be able to market their authorized generics during the first-filing generic
manufacturer's 180 day period of exclusivity. 43 If that were the case, brand
name manufacturers would be treated like other generic manufacturers who
file ANDAs subsequent to the first-filer and cannot market their generic
versions during the exclusivity period. 44  Mylan also argued that the
marketing of authorized generics impeded competition and reduced the
incentive for generic manufacturers to challenge the innovator's patent
through the ANDA process.45 The marketing of authorized generics reduces
the incentive for generic manufacturers to file ANDAs, because it reduces
the reward of the 180-day exclusivity period for the first ANDA filer.46 The
effects of authorized generics, Mylan argued, were contrary to the intent of
the Hatch-Waxman Act.
47
The FDA rejected Mylan's petition on July 2, 2004, stating that it only
had the power to regulate the safety and efficacy of new drugs for the benefit
of public health and welfare, but did not have the power to regulate
competition.48  Therefore, because the authorized generic has already
received approval of the new drug from the FDA, the FDA cannot prohibit
this practice.4 9 In addition, the FDA stated that authorized generics actually
Circumvent Hatch- Waxman Provisions, MED AD NEws, Aug. 1, 2004, available at 2004
WLNR 14404075.
40. Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 207 F. Supp. 2d 476, 479 (N.D.W.Va. 2001).
41. Mylan Citizen Petition, supra note 37, at 3.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 2.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 3. When filing an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification, a generic
manufacturer is challenging the validity of the branded manufacturer's patent or stating
that the patent will not be infringed by the generic manufacturer's marketing of its
generic version. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 7, at 600.
46. See Mylan Citizen Petition, supra note 37, at 3.
47. Id. at 1.
48. FDA Response to Mylan Citizen Petition, supra note 37, at 2.
49. Id.
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"further[] the Hatch-Waxman objective of enhancing competition overall
among drug products.,
50
After the FDA rejected Mylan's citizen petition, Mylan filed suit against
the FDA in federal court in West Virginia.51 Mylan asked the court to
invalidate the FDA's denial of Mylan's petition to prohibit Proctor &
52Gamble from marketing an authorized generic version of Macrobid.
Mylan argued that the practice of authorized generics "stifles generic
competition" and devalues the incentive to challenge pioneer patents through
53the ANDA process.
On August 30, 2004, Mylan asked for a dismissal of its complaint without
prejudice so that it could later refile its case to include antitrust allegations.54
Mylan has since refiled its lawsuit, this time asserting that Proctor & Gamble
has violated antitrust laws. 55 Before the suit was dropped, U.S. District
Judge Irene Keely, who presided over the dispute, made a statement
implying that Congress was to blame for the problematic issue of authorized
generics. 56 She said that under the current law, "any brand can go out and
market its product as a generic at any time because it's not covered in the
law."57 Judge Keely further opined that "authorized generics look.., like a
gaping black hole that's been ignored or avoided....
Part I of this comment describes the ANDA process and the legislative
history of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Part I also explains how Congress, the
FDA, and courts have addressed the ways brand name manufacturers have
attempted to prevent generic competition. It offers other interpretative
issues that have arisen since the inception of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Part II
analyzes the issue of authorized generics by examining Mylan's citizen
petition requesting that the FDA prohibit the marketing of authorized
generics and the FDA's subsequent rejection of that petition. Part Ill
comments on how the Hatch-Waxman Act has not specifically addressed the
issue of authorized generics, which has left the FDA and courts ill-equipped
50. Id. at 12.
51. Mylan Sues Over Authorized Generics Citing Antitrust Violation, INSIDE CMS,
Dec. 2, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 12914475.
52. FDA Says Drug Law Does Not Require It to Bar Authorized Generics, FDA
WEEK, Aug. 20, 2004, available at 2004 WL 78295041.
53. Id.
54. See Associated Press, Mylan to Refile Case Challenging Authorized Generics,
USATODAY.COM Aug. 30, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/
industries/health/drugs/2004-08-30-mylan-lawsuit x.htm.
55. Mylan Sues Over Authorized Generics Citing Antitrust Violation, FDA WEEK,
Nov. 19, 2004, available at 2004 WL 78295274.
56. Smith, supra note 6.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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to stop this practice. Part Ill also explains how Congress must stop this
practice by making new amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT AND THE 180-DAY PERIOD
OF EXCLUSIVITY
In order to understand Mylan's argument that the marketing of authorized
generics by brand name manufacturers impedes competition from generic
manufacturers and reduces the incentive for generic manufacturers to
challenge an innovator's patent through the ANDA process, it is necessary
to understand the ANDA process and the Congressional intent underlying
the Hatch-Waxman Act. It is also important to examine how the FDA has
interpreted the Hatch-Waxman Act through its regulations.
A. ANDA Approval and Market Exclusivity
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the FDA will approve a generic
manufacturer's ANDA only when the generic version of the pioneer drug is
the "same" or the "bioequivalent" of the pioneer drug, which must have been
already approved by the FDA.59 "The 'sameness' requirement provides that
the active ingredient, route of administration, dosage form, strength, and
labeling must all be the same as the pioneer product." 0
Under §505(j)(2)(A)(vii) of the FDCA, when a generic manufacturer files
an ANDA, the generic manufacturer must include one of four certifications:
(1) that the brand name manufacturer has not listed the patent information
for its pioneer drug; (2) that the brand name manufacturer's patent has
expired; (3) that the brand name manufacturer's patent will expire on a
certain date, after which the generic manufacturer may market its generic
version; (4) or that the patent, on which the ANDA is based, "is invalid or
will not be infringed by the manufacture, use or sale of the new drug for
which the application is submitted.,
61
The fourth certification is known as a paragraph IV certification, and
when an ANDA is filed with a paragraph IV certification ("paragraph IV
ANDA"), the generic manufacturer must give notice of its ANDA
59. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 7, at page 594.
60. Id.; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(2000); Larissa Burford, Note, In re
Cardizem & Valley Drug Co.: The Hatch-Waxman Act, Anticompetitive Actions, and
Regulatory Reform, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 365, 368 n. 15 (2004).
61. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(2000).
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application to the brand name manufacturer of the pioneer drug.
6 2
Additionally, the ANDA filer must offer the innovator in its notice "an
explanation as to why it believes the patent is invalid or not applicable. '63
Therefore, this notice is essentially a challenge of the brand name
manufacturer's patent.
64
Once the brand name manufacturer has received notice of the generic
manufacturer's paragraph IV ANDA, the branded manufacturer has 45 days
to bring a patent infringement suit.65 If suit is filed within this 45 day
period, the FDA is barred from:
approving the [generic manufacturer's] ANDA, or any subsequent
ANDA, for thirty months or until the successful resolution of the
patent infringement suit, whichever is earlier, at which time the
first ANDA applicant is eligible for FDA approval and upon such
approval is awarded a 180-day exclusivity period in which to
market its generic version.
6 6
It is important to note that although the FDA cannot grant "final" approval
until either the end of the 30-month period or successful resolution of the
patent infringement suit, whichever is earlier, the FDA may grant "tentative"
approval of the ANDA "if the FDA determines that the ANDA would
62. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 383 F. Supp. 2d 686, 691 (E.D.Pa.
2004); see also Shieber, supra note 2, at 75.
63. Shieber, supra note 2, at 75; see also SmithKline, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 691 (stating
in its notice to the brand name manufacturer, the generic manufacturer must "[set] forth a
detailed statement of the factual and legal basis for the applicant's opinion that the patent
is not valid or will not be infringed"); 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(3)(B), (j)(2)(B)(ii)(2000).
64. SmithKline, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 691.
65. Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., Int'l, 256 F.3d 799, 802 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
66. Id.; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(2000). Section 505(j)(5)(B)(iii)'s
thirty-month stay provision has had some anticompetitive effects. Shieber, supra note 2,
at 75. Brand name manufacturers have an incentive to list patents of "doubtful validity"
in order to prevent generic competition. Id. Moreover, "[e]ven if the patents are quickly
declared by a court to be invalid or inapplicable, the automatic stay provision works in
the branded manufacturer's favor." Id. The brand name manufacturer can also employ
other techniques to prevent generic competition. Brand name manufacturers will also
bypass the whole litigation process by settling the suit with the generic manufacturer who
files the first ANDA. Id. Brand name manufacturers have settled suits and paid the
generic manufacturer to not market its generic version of the pioneer drug and, therefore,
not use its 180-day exclusivity period. Id. (stating that, "because the first filer is given
180 days of exclusivity whether or not it prosecutes the underlying patent case to its
conclusion, [] such an agreement can create a bottleneck that effectively blocks generic
competition"). This type of collusion between brand name manufacturers and generic
manufacturers also has the effect of blocking all sales by subsequent ANDA applicants.
Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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" a ,,67otherwise receive final approval but for the thirty month stay."68 A tentative
approval is an approval that has a delayed effective date.68  Tentative
approval is not effective "until[the]FDA issues a letter granting final
effective approval. 69
Once approved, the first-filing generic manufacturer is entitled to the 180-
day exclusivity period. 70  The 180-day exclusivity period is governed by
Sections 505(j)(5)(B)(iv) and 505(j)(5)(D) of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
Section 505(j)(5)(B)(iv) states that the exclusivity period begins either when
the generic applicant first markets the drug commercially, or on the date of a
court decision holding that the brand name manufacturer's patent is invalid
or is not being infringed upon, whichever is earlier. 72  Subsection (1) of
Section 505(j)(5)(B)(iv) is the "commercial-marketing trigger" of the 180-
day exclusivity period, and Subsection (11) is the "court-decision trigger.
73
During the 180-day exclusivity period, no other generic versions of the
pioneer drug can come to market.74 This encourages generic applicants to' r " 75
challenge the patent on the innovator's pioneer drug.
B. The Legislative History on the 180-Day Period of Exclusivity is Limited
and Provides Very Little Guidance for the FDA and Courts
When Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984, they failed to
provide much guidance for interpreting the statutory provisions regarding
76the 180-day exclusivity period. Congress included the provisions in order
67. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1288-89
(S.D. Fla. 2005).
68. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Thompson, 389 F.3d 1272, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
69. Id.
70. Andrx, 256 F.3d at 802; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(2000).
71. Lietzan, supra note 12, at 288.
72. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(2000).
73. Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
74. See Lietzan, supra note 12, at 288.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 293. Congress only referred to the 180-day exclusivity provision twice,
once in part one of the final House Report and once in part two, where it basically repeats
the sentence from part one. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 28 (1984) as reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686; H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 16 (1984) as reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686. Part one of the final House Report states that:
If an ANDA certifying patent invalidity or non-infringement is filed subsequent
to an ANDA for the same listed drug that has made the same certification of
invalidity or non-infringement, paragraph (4)(B)(iv) provides that the approval
of the subsequent ANDA may not be made effective sooner than 180 days after
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to promote the purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act, which were to
encourage competition by generic manufacturers and innovation of new drug
products.7 7  The 180-day exclusivity period was created in contemplation
that brand name manufacturers would bring patent infringement suits upon
the filing of paragraph IV ANDAs by generic manufacturers.78 Congress
recognized that first-filing generic manufacturers would be subject to costly
patent litigation, and thus created the 180-day exclusivity period to
"encourage the generic [manufacturer] to undertake this risky behavior." 79
Congress' prediction has proved to be correct as generic manufacturers who
file a paragraph IV ANDA are frequently sued for patent infringement,
making the 180-day exclusivity period invaluable to generic
manufacturers.8 0
Although the Congressional intent behind the entire Act was clear, the
legislative history for the provisions relating to the 180-day exclusivity
period is limited.8 1 "Indeed, the provision is mentioned only twice in the
final House Report."8 2 Therefore, "[w]hile seemingly a simple provision of
the Act, the 180-day exclusivity has led to a number of controversies. 83
the previous applicant has begun commercial marketing, or the date on which
the court holds the patent invalid or not infringed, whichever occurs first. In the
event of multiple ANDAs certifying patent invalidity or non-infringement, the
courts should employ the existing rules for multidistrict litigation, when
appropriate to avoid hardship on the parties and witnesses and to promote the
just and efficient conduct of the patent infringement actions.
H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 28 (1984).
77. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 7, at 595; see also H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt.
2, at 4 (1984).
78. Jonathan M. Lave, Responding to Patent Litigation Settlements: Does the FTC
Have it Right Yet?, 64 U. PITr. L. REV. 201, 206 (2002).
79. Id.
80. Id. (stating that a 2002 study by the FTC found that "in nearly 75% of drug
products studied, the pioneer company initiated patent infringement litigation against the
first Paragraph IV applicant"); see also FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 13 (2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf [hereinafter FTC STUDY].
81. Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also
Lietzan, supra note 12, at 293.
82. Lietzan, supra note 12, at 293.
83. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 7, at 603.
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C. Congress and the Courts Have Addressed Issues Involving Anti-
Competitive Behavior by Brand Name Manufacturers and FDA Regulations
that Have Impeded the Ability of Generic Manufacturers to Market Their
Generic Versions
84
The Hatch-Waxman Act's market exclusivity provisions have been
frequently litigated in federal courts since their enactment. Many cases have
involved FDA regulations interpreting the statute, and others have involved
the ways brand name manufacturers have abused the statutory provisions in
their attempts to prevent competition from generic manufacturers. In order
to curb these abuses and to clarify the 180-day exclusivity provisions,
Congress amended the FDCA by enacting the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 ("Medicare Act of 2003"). 5
The FDA also amended some of its regulations to help curb these abuses.
86
In order to understand the amendments that Congress made to the Hatch-
Waxman Act, the changes that the FDA also made, and the holdings of
courts, it is necessary to understand the issues that gave rise to these
changes. Below, this comment will address some of the significant changes
that were made by Congress and the FDA and will give some of the
background behind these changes. In addition, it will address some of the
issues courts have faced involving FDA regulations and ways that brand
name manufacturers have used the provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act to
prevent generic competition. Through understanding the issues that
Congress, the FDA, and the courts have addressed with the Hatch-Waxman
Act, the intents and purposes of the Act will be discussed and it will enable a
better understanding of the gaping black hole that authorized generics have
exposed.
84. Although Congress, the FDA, and courts have addressed many interpretative
issues since the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, I will only focus on some of the
key issues that are important to this comment.
85. See Apotex, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 187, 189-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2004);
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1335-36 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
86. Richard J. Smith, Hatch- Waxman 2003-Patented v. Generic Drugs: Regulatory,
Legislative and Judicial Developments, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
695, 702 (2004); see also Melissa Ganz, The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
& Modernization Act of 2003: Are We Playing the Lottery with Healthcare Reform?,
2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 11 (2004).
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1. The Thirty-Month Stay from Approval
In the 2003 Amendments, Congress mandated that when the first generic
manufacturer files a paragraph IV ANDA and provides notice to the brand
name manufacturer, the brand name manufacturer cannot obtain more than
one thirty-month automatic stay of approval of the ANDA by the FDA.
87
This amendment codified the FDA's regulatory amendments earlier that
year.88  The FDA's regulatory amendments were made in response to
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") studies that indicated that brand name
manufacturers had been using the thirty-month stay provisions to delay• - 89
market entry by the first-filing generic manufacturer.
Prior to these amendments by Congress and the FDA, brand name
manufacturers had "a substantial incentive to list patents in the Orange
Book, even if the listing is of doubtful validity." 90 In the case of In re
Buspirone Patent & Antitrust Litig., a brand name manufacturer, Bristol-
Myers Squibb, did just that.9 ' Right before its patent for the anti-anxiety
drug BuSpar ("buspirone") was to expire, Bristol-Meyers Squibb submitted
another patent application with the FDA, which subsequently listed the
patent in the Orange Book, for a metabolite that buspirone naturally
92produces in the body when taking the drug. The generic manufacturer,
Mylan, was about to begin marketing a generic version of buspirone, and as
a result of Bristol-Myers Squibb's listing of the new patent, had to stop its
shipment orders. 93 Bristol-Myers Squibb argued that Mylan's sale of the
generic version of the old patented drug would violate the patent on the new
listed drug.
94
By listing another patent in the Orange Book, whether valid or not, the
generic manufacturer with a paragraph IV ANDA may be subject to
additional patent infringement lawsuits, which can significantly delay the
generic manufacturer coming to market.95  These patent infringement
"lawsuits can effectively give innovator companies up to another 30 months
87. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 383 F. Supp. 2d 686, 691 n. 3 (E.D.
Pa. 2004); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2000).
88. See Smith, supra note 84, at 702.
89. See id. at 701; see also FTC STUDY, supra note 78, at v.
90. See Shieber, supra note 2, at 75.
91. See In re Buspirone Patent & Antitrust Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
92. Id. at 343.
93. The Stalling Game, supra note 2.
94. In re Buspirone, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 343.
95. The Stalling Game, supra note 2; see also Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A.
Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REv. 63, 82 (2004).
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of market exclusivity under the Hatch-Waxman Act." 96  Brand name
manufacturers benefit from the thirty-month automatic stay provision
through this delay tactic, "even if the patents are quickly declared by a court
to be invalid or inapplicable....
'97
Therefore, after FTC studies indicated that permitting only one 30-month
stay "should eliminate most of the potential for improper Orange Book
listings to generate unwarranted [30]-month stays," the FDA amended its
rules, which Congress codified in the Medicare Act of 2003, to eliminate
multiple thirty-month stays per ANDA. 98
2. The First-Filing Generic Manufacturer's Market Exclusivity Will
Run Even If the Generic Manufacturer is Marketing and Selling the
Brand Name Manufacturer's Listed NDA
In the Medicare Act of 2003, Congress also "slightly altered" the 180-day
market exclusivity provision to apply to situations where the first-filing
generic manufacturer, who obtains the 180 days of market exclusivity,
markets the brand name manufacturer's listed drug.99  This amendment
codified a 2001 decision by a district court in West Virginia, which held
"that a generic manufacturer begins commercial marketing, and thereby
starts the 180-day clock, even when it sells a private label version of the
innovator's product, rather than the product that is the subject of its
ANDA."' 100 In that case, Mylan, the first-filing generic manufacturer, filed
suit against the FDA for denying its 180-day period of market exclusivity.
10 1
Mylan had filed the first paragraph IV ANDA for 30mg generic version of
Pfizer Inc.'s ("Pfizer") nifedipine drug patent, after which Pfizer filed a
patent infringement suit against Mylan.
In 2000, Pfizer and Mylan executed a settlement agreement whereby the
civil action would be dismissed, Pfizer would give Mylan a license to sell
Pfizer's drug in three different dosage levels, and Mylan would be able to
96. The Stalling Game, supra note 2; see also Shieber, supra note 2, at 75 ("Because
every month that generic competition is kept off the market will result in significant
additional sales for the branded product . .
97. Shieber, supra note 2, at 75.
98. See Smith, supra note 86, at 701-02; see also FTC STUDY, supra note 78, at v;
SmithKline, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 691 n.3; 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2000).
99. Teva Pharm., Indus., v. FDA, 355 F. Supp. 2d 111, 114 n.5 (D.D.C. 2004); see
also 21 U.S.C. § 355()(5)(B)(iv)(1)(2000).
100. Lietzan, supra note 12, at 304; see also Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 207 F.
Supp. 2d 476 (N.D.W.Va. 2001).
101. Id. at 483.
102. Id. at 481.
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market its own generic version of Pfizer's drug.'0 3  Because of this
agreement, the FDA denied Mylan its 180-day period of exclusivity, and
then approved Biovail Laboratories, Inc.'s ("Biovail") paragraph IV
ANDA. 104 The FDA denied Mylan the 180-day exclusivity period because
the FDA concluded that the settlement agreement between Pfizer and Mylan,
whereby Mylan would sell a private label generic version of Pfizer's listed
drug, effectively changed Mylan's ANDA from paragraph IV certification to
a paragraph III certification, making Mylan no longer eligible for market
exclusivity. 105 The FDA also held "that Mylan, by marketing its private
label generic version of Pfizer's [patented drug], as opposed to its own 30
milligram ANDA product, triggered the 'commercial marketing' provision
of 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) thereby commencing the running of the
180-day exclusivity period."'
10 6
Mylan filed suit, claiming that the FDA was required to withdraw its
approval of Biovail's later-filed paragraph IV ANDA, because Mylan's
exclusivity period had not commenced. 107 Although the court did not agree
with the FDA that the settlement agreement between Pfizer and Mylan
changed Mylan's ANDA from a paragraph IV certification to paragraph III
certification, the court did agree with the FDA in holding that by marketing
Pfizer's listed drug as a licensee, Mylan's 180-day period of exclusivity had
commenced.108 Congress codified this holding in the Medicare Act of 2003,
which states that the 180-day exclusivity period becomes effective upon the
commercial marketing of the ANDA applicant's generic version of the listed
drug or a private label version of the listed drug.' ° 9
3. Agreements to Not Enter the Market
In 2003, Congress also made amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act in
order to prevent brand name and generic manufacturers from entering into
anti-competitive agreements that are designed to maintain market share in
103. Id.
104. Id. at 482.
105. Id.
106. Id. The FDA claimed that "whether Mylan markets the produce [sic] approved
in its ANDA or the produce [sic] approved is Pfizer's NDA is [sic] of little import to the
statutory scheme; Mylan has begun commercial marketing of genetic nifedipine,
permitting Mylan to market nifedipine without triggering the beginning of exclusivity
would be inconsistent with the intent of the statutory scheme." Id. at 488.
107. Id. at 483.
108. Id. at 488.
109. Teva Pharm., Indus., v. FDA, 355 F. Supp. 2d 111, 114 n.5 (D.D.C. 2004); see
also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I)(2000).
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the sale of a drug. 1 0 Since the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, brand
name manufacturers have been able to use the first-filer and 180-day
exclusivity provisions to their advantage by paying first-filing generic
manufacturers to not market their generic versions during the exclusivity
period.'1 ' "Rather than face the risks of litigating the underlying patent suit,
the branded manufacturer can settle the suit, pay the first filer not to come to
market, and continue to reap its monopoly profits (less whatever is paid to
the first filer)."''1 2 This type of agreement has been successful in preventing
generic competition, because under the original statute, if the first-filing
generic manufacturer failed to enter the market, then the exclusivity period
was not triggered, "and subsequently filed ANDAs [could not] be
approved.""13 This type of agreement is called "parking," in that it "parks"
the 180-day exclusivity period, and it can have the effect of "infinitely
delaying ANDA approvals and bottlenecking the market."
114
To prevent this practice, Congress enacted forfeiture provisions for the
180-day exclusivity period in the 2003 Amendments to the Hatch-Waxman
Act. 115 In enacting the forfeiture provisions, Congress also "replaced the
traditional ['court decision trigger']."'1 6 The forfeiture provisions create
consequences for a generic manufacturer's failure to come to market. Under
the new provisions, the 180-day exclusivity period is forfeited if the first
generic manufacturer to file a paragraph IV ANDA fails to market the
generic version of the pioneer drug by the later of: (1) 75 days after the
effective approval of its application, or 30 months after it was submitted,
whichever is earlier; or (2) 75 days after the date on which a court decision
has held that the brand name manufacturer's patent is invalid or is not being
infringed upon, a settlement has been approved by the court, or the brand
name manufacturer has withdrawn its patent information. 1
7
The generic manufacturer also forfeits the 180-day exclusivity period if:
(]) the first ANDA applicant withdraws its application; (2) the first ANDA
applicant withdraws its paragraph IV certification; (3) the first ANDA
applicant does not receive approval of its ANDA within 30 months after it
was filed; (4) the first ANDA applicant enters into an agreement with
another party, such as the patent holder, that the FTC or a court has found to
110. See Apotex, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 187, 189-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
I1. Shieber, supra note 2, at 75.
112. Id.
113. Apotex, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 189-90.
114. Id.; see also Shieber, supra note 2, at 75.
115. Apotex, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 189-90.
116. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, at 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
117. See 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(5)(D)(2000); see also Lietzan, supra note 12, at 289.
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be in violation of the federal antitrust laws; or (5) the original patent, on
which the paragraph IV ANDA was based, has expired.' 18
Apart from the time-related forfeiture provisions, the statute states that if
the settlement agreement violates the federal antitrust laws, then the
exclusivity period will be forfeited. 119  In addition, each party to an
agreement involving the 180-day exclusivity period or the sale or marketing
of a brand name or generic drug - whether the agreement is between a brand
name manufacturer and a generic manufacturer or between generic
manufacturers - must file the agreement with the FTC and the Attorney
General within ten business days of the agreement's execution.
1 2 0
Therefore, by expanding the forfeiture provisions in the Medicare Act of
2003, Congress intended to prevent the practice of "parking" the exclusivity
period and "force generic manufacturers to market promptly."' 2 1  In
addition, Congress sought to prevent these anti-competitive agreements by
employing FTC scrutiny of such agreements. 122 It is clear that after the 2003
Amendments, "settlement agreements between drug manufacturers to
resolve patent infringement litigation triggered by a paragraph IV
certification, and that involve reverse payments, will be treated as highly
suspect." 1
23
4. Declaratory Judgment to Obtain Patent Certainty and Orange
Book Listing Remedies
In the Medicare Act of 2003, Congress also included in its changes a
provision directed to a "civil action to obtain patent certainty. ' 124  This
provision allows a generic manufacturer to bring a federal suit for a
declaratory action that the patent is either invalid or will not be infringed by
the generic version if the brand name manufacturer does bring a timely
118. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(5)(D)(2000); see also Lietzan, supra note 12, at 289.
119. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(5)(D)(2000). "The term 'antitrust laws' includes section
1 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12) and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
(15 U.S.C. 45) to the extent that that section applies to unfair methods of competition."
Smith, supra note 86, at 708 n.88.
120. Smith, supra note 86, at 708; see also Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, 1112-13 (2003).
121. Lietzan, supra note 12, at 314; see Apotex, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 189-90.
122. Diane Green-Kelly, FTC, Split Circuit Courts Raise Questions About Legality of
Pharmaceutical Patent Suit Settlements, MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, May 14, 2004,
available at 2004 WLNR 12288800.
123. Id.
124. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, at 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C) (West Supp. 2004).
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patent infringement suit. 25 The generic manufacturer must give the brand
name manufacturer "confidential access to its ANDA application so that the
[brand name manufacturer] can evaluate possible infringement."' 126
In addition, a generic manufacturer that is sued for patent infringement
may also bring a counterclaim to delist the patented NDA. 127 Although a
counterclaim to delist the patent is not an independent cause of action and
can only be brought if the generic manufacturer is sued for patent
infringement, 128 it "may circumvent the need to confront the presumption of
validity that a patent enjoys."' 129 If successful on the counterclaim, a generic
manufacturer may also be able to get its thirty-month stay of approval of its
paragraph IV ANDA terminated."3 At the very least, with the addition of
the counterclaim and declaratory judgment provisions, Congress has given
generic manufacturers a greater ability to challenge the listed patents of
brand name manufacturers, and possibly speed up the approval of their
paragraph IV ANDAs.1
3 1
5. Courts have rejected the FDA's "Successful Defense" and
"Involvement in a Patent Infringement Suit" Requirements
Since the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, courts have not only
addressed the ways that brand name manufacturers have used the provisions
of the Act to prevent generic competition, but also have addressed FDA
regulations governing ANDA approval and market exclusivity. The FDA
did not implement finalized regulations governing the 180-day exclusivity
period provisions until 1994, ten years after the Hatch-Waxman Act was
enacted by Congress. 32 One of the FDA's regulations required that the first
generic manufacturer to file a paragraph IV ANDA must "successfully
defend against a suit for patent infringement" before it could obtain market
exclusivity. 33 In addition to the "successful defense" requirement, the 1994
125. Teva, 395 F.3d at 1329; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C) (West Supp. 2004).
126. Id.
127. Smith, supra note 86, at 709; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii) (West Supp.
2005).
128. Id.
129. Mark Feldman, Medicare Improvement Act of 2003-Much More than Just A




132. Lietzan, supra note 12, at 294.
133. Id.; see also Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1065 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
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regulation maintained that "a generic applicant would be entitled to
exclusivity only when it has itself been involved in a patent infringement
lawsuit."' 134 Both of these requirements have been rejected by the courts.'
3 5
a. The "Successful Defense'" Requirement
In Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, the Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit
rejected the FDA's requirement that the first generic manufacturer to file an
ANDA with a paragraph IV certification had to successfully defend against a
patent infringement suit in order to trigger the 180-day exclusivity period."'
Mova Pharmaceutical Corporation ("Mova") had filed an ANDA with a
paragraph IV certification for a generic version of micronized glyburide, a
drug used to treat diabetes that was created by Pharmacia & Upjohn
Company ("Upjohn"). 137 Upjohn brought a patent infringement suit against
Mova.
During this litigation, Mylan filed an ANDA with a paragraph IV
certification for a generic version of the same drug. 138  The FDA
subsequently approved Mylan's ANDA to market its generic version of
micronized glyburide. 13 9 Mova filed suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia attempting to "compel the FDA to delay the
effective date" of the approval of Mylan's generic drug. 140 Mova argued
that, under section 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the FDA was
prohibited from approving Mylan's ANDA until the end of Mova's 180-day
exclusivity period. This exclusivity period would start either when Mova
first commercially marketed its generic version of the pioneer drug or when
Mova had won its patent infringement suit against Upjohn. 14 1
The FDA argued that "Mova's exclusivity did not bar approval of the
Mylan ANDA because Mova had not yet successfully defended against
[Upjohn's] suit. '142 Mova, however, claimed that the successful defense
requirement was "inconsistent with the plain language of §
134. Lietzan, supra note 12, at 295; see also Abbreviated New Drug Application
Regulations; Patent Exclusivity Provisions, 59 Fed. Reg. 50,338, 50,352-53 (Oct. 3,
1994) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314).
135. See Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Friedman, 162 F.3d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Inwood
Labs., Inc. v. Young, 723 F. Supp. 1523 (D.D.C. 1989).
136. Mova, 140 F.3d at 1076.




141. Id. at 1062-63.
142. Lietzan, supra note 12, at 296.
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355(j)(5)(B)(iv)."' 143 The district court agreed with Mova and granted a
preliminary injunction requiring the FDA to stay approval of Mylan's
ANDA "until 180 days after Mova won its suit or began to market its
product (whichever came first)."'
44
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed, finding that the FDA's successful
defense requirement was "inconsistent with the literal language of the
statute."'145 The court stated that under the statute, an ANDA filed after the
first paragraph IV ANDA can only be approved 180 days after the
commercial-marketing trigger or court-decision has been satisfied. 146 The
FDA's "successful defense" requirement, however, allows subsequent
ANDAs to be approved "even though neither trigger has been satisfied,
simply because the first applicant's litigation has not yet come to a
successful conclusion."'
147
The court also held that the successful defense requirement was
inconsistent with the purpose of the 180-day exclusivity provision, in that
the requirement has the practical effect of "[writing] the commercial-
marketing trigger out of the statute."'148 Therefore, the court invalidated the
successful defense requirement, preventing the FDA from approving any
subsequent ANDAs until after the first-filer's 180 days of market
exclusivity.
b. The "Involvement in a Patent Infringement Suit" Requirement
In Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Friedman, the D.C. Circuit held that the first
generic manufacturer to file an ANDA does not have to be sued for patent
infringement in order to benefit from market exclusivity.' 49 In this case,
Torpharm was the first generic manufacturer to file a paragraph IV ANDA
for a generic version of the drug ticlopidine hydrochloride, which had the
brand-name "Ticlid.' 50 Torpharm was not sued for patent infringement,
and the FDA had not finally approved Torpharm's ANDA when another
generic manufacturer, Purepac Pharmaceutical Company ("Purepac"), filed a
subsequent ANDA with the FDA.'' Although Purepac's ANDA had
become ready for approval, the FDA only tentatively approved Purepac's
143. Mova, 140 F.3d at 1063.
144. Id.




149. Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Friedman, 162 F.3d 1201, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
150. Id. at 1202.
151. Id.
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ANDA, withholding "final approval pending Torpharm's final approval,
commercial marketing, and expiry of its 180-day exclusivity.'
' 52
Purepac brought suit seeking a preliminary injunction and a declaratory
judgment, arguing that Torpharm was not entitled to the 180-day exclusivity
period, because it had not been sued for patent infringement. 153 After the
Mova decision, the FDA removed the "successful defense" requirement
from its regulations governing the 180-day exclusivity period. 154  In
addition, the FDA said that it would follow the Mova court's more literal
interpretation of the statute.' 55 In doing so, the FDA also removed the
phrase "if sued for patent infringement."'' 56 Therefore, the D.C. Circuit
found that the FDA eliminated the requirement that a generic applicant must
be sued for patent infringement in order to be entitled to the 180-day period
of exclusivity, and thus had complied with the Mova decision. 5 7 The D.C.
Circuit also held that the FDA's decision to withhold approval of Purepac's
ANDA until Torpharm's commercial marketing of their generic to be
consistent with section 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 158
By rejecting the FDA's "successful defense" and "involvement in a patent
infringement suit" requirements, courts have sustained the commercial-
marketing trigger for the exclusivity period. 159 In the Medicare Act of 2003,
Congress went even further than the courts in promoting the commercial-
marketing trigger by practically eliminating the court decision trigger.
160
1I. MYLAN AND THE "AUTHORIZED GENERICS" PROBLEM
Over the past few years, brand name manufacturers have been marketing
authorized generics. Authorized generics are basically the same drug as the
152. Lietzan, supra note 12, at 299; see also Purepac, 162 F.3d at 1202.
153. Purepac, 162 F.3d at 1202.
154. Id. at 1203; see also Effective Date of Approval of an Abbreviated New Drug
Application, 63 Fed. Reg. 59,710 (proposed Nov. 5, 1998; interim rule effective Nov. 10,
1998) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314).
155. Purepac, 162 F.3d at 1203.
156. Id. at 1204 n.5; see also Effective Date of Approval of an Abbreviated New Drug
Application, 63 Fed. Reg. 59,710, 59,712 (proposed Nov. 5, 1998; interim rule effective
Nov. 10, 1998) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314).
157. Purepac, 162 F.3d at 1204.
158. Id. at 1205.
159. See Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1998);
Purepac, 162 F.3d at 1205.
160. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1328-29 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
see also Lietzan, supra note 12, at 310; 21 U.S.C. § 355(J)5)(C) (West Supp. 2005).
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brand name manufacturer's pioneer drug, but they are renamed and sold
through a licensed distributor.16  Authorized generics are simply the new
scheme that brand name manufacturers have employed to prevent generic
competition, and the Generic Pharmaceutical Association has argued that
this practice threatens the generic industry's existence "by giving brand-
name manufacturers total control of the market."
'' 62
A. Mylan Filed a Citizen Petition Asking the FDA to Prohibit the Marketing
ofAuthorized Generics During the Exclusivity Period
On February 17, 2004, Mylan filed a citizen petition with the FDA
requesting that the FDA stop the practice of authorized generics. 163 This
petition was filed after Proctor & Gamble had licensed its drug "Macrobid"
to Watson Pharmaceuticals during Mylan's 180-day exclusivity period .
64
Through Watson, Proctor & Gamble began to market its authorized generic
11 ,165
"around the same time that Mylan launched its generic version. In its
petition, Mylan argued that authorized generics "are the same as true
'generic' drugs, and therefore, should be prohibited from being marketed
during the exclusivity period."'166 Mylan further argued that permitting
authorized generics would be contrary to the intent of the law, and that
Mylan is eligible for 180-days of market exclusivity.
67
Mylan argued that under the Hatch-Waxman Act, a generic manufacturer
who first files a paragraph IV ANDA becomes eligible for a 180-day period
of exclusivity to market that product. All subsequent paragraph IV
ANDAs cannot be finally approved until the first applicant's 180-day
exclusivity period has expired. Mylan cited a U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit's opinion in arguing that the purpose of the Hatch-
Waxman Act was to grant generic manufacturers that successfully challenge
patents the right to sell generic versions of pioneer drugs "without
competition for 180 days. 170 Mylan claimed that the marketing of
authorized generics by brand name manufacturers reduces the incentive for
161. Smith, supra note 6.
162. Id.
163. Mylan Citizen Petition, supra note 37, at 1.
164. Mylan Sues Over Authorized Generics Citing Antitrust Violations, supra note 5 1.
165. Id.




170. Id. at 2 (citing Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Thompson, 354 F.3d 877, 878 (D.C. Cir.
2004).
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generic manufacturers to challenge the brand name manufacturers'
patents.17 1 Mylan urged the FDA to treat authorized generics like all other
generics 172 by prohibiting the marketing of authorized generics until the first
generic ANDA applicant's 180-day period of exclusivity has expired.
173
Mylan described the "typical authorized generic scheme" as a situation
where a brand name manufacturer licenses a generic version of its ioneer
drug, "while continuing to market the same drug as a 'brand' drug." 74 The
licensee packages the drug with its own label and NDC number, and the
license agreement usually requires that the licensee wait to market the drug
until the first generic manufacturer begins its 180-day period of market
exclusivity. 175 Mylan stated that this arrangement "cripple[s] the Paragraph
IV ANDA applicant's exclusivity."
'1 76
Mylan argued that the authorized generic is the "exact same drug" as the
pioneer drug and that the authorized generic is not competing with the brand
name drug, but rather, it is competing with the "true" generic drug, or the
generic version of the pioneer drug marketed with 180 days of exclusivity.
177
At the same time, the authorized generic is not subject to the same approval
process as other generics under the Hatch-Waxman Act.'
78
Mylan claimed that because authorized generics are directly competing
with generic versions of the same drug, authorized generics should be
subject to a separate approval process by the FDA. 179 Mylan argued that the
approval process did not have to be burdensome, and that the FDA "could
require the authorized generic applicant to submit a one-page application to
identify the distributor and manufacturer of the drug." 80 Mylan further
stated that if"no other generic applicant is eligible for exclusivity, the FDA
would grant final approval to the application.'
8 1
Mylan essentially suggests that when a generic paragraph IV ANDA
applicant is the first to file with the FDA and becomes entitled to the 180-
day exclusivity period, then the brand name manufacturer that markets an
authorized generic should be treated like subsequent paragraph IV ANDA
171. Mylan Citizen Petition, supra note 37, at 2.
172. See id. at l.
173. See id.





179. Id. at 3.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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applicants. 82 Like subsequent paragraph IV ANDA applicants, they should
be prohibited from marketing their generic versions, the authorized generics,
during the 180-day exclusivity period.183 Like subsequent paragraph IV
ANDA applicants, brand name manufacturers would have to wait until the
first generic applicant's 180 days of market exclusivity expire before they
can enter the market.' 84 Mylan's argument is that this type of policy would
ensure that the intent of Congress in passing the Hatch-Waxman Act is
furthered. 18
B. The FDA Rejected Mylan's Petition, Claiming That Not Only Does it Not
Have the Authority to Prohibit Authorized Generics, But That Authorized
Generics Further the Purposes of the Hatch- Waxman Act
On July 2, 2004, the FDA denied Mylan's petition 186 stating that under the
Hatch-Waxman Act, it does not have the authority to regulate
competition. 87 The FDA said that it only has the authority to regulate issues
of public health, and that it does not regulate drug prices.' 88 The FDA said
that nothing in the Hatch-Waxman Act "authorizes [the] FDA to prohibit
categorically the marketing of authorized generics during 180-day
exclusivity periods."'
' 89
The FDA also stated that Mylan's proposal, in which authorized generics
would be subject to a separate approval process by the FDA, and therefore
treated like other generics, is not persuasive because the Hatch-Waxman Act
only forbids the marketing of a new drug that has not been approved. The
FDA argued that the Hatch-Waxman Act does not prohibit the use of
alternative marketing practices for an already-approved drug.
19 1
The FDA also stated that although it does not regulate competition under
the Hatch-Waxman Act, competition is a fundamental objective of the
Act.192 The FDA claimed that this objective is accomplished through the
ANDA process, whereby generic manufacturers can challenge the
innovator's patent and gain market exclusivity before the end of the patent
182. See id. at 1,3.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 1-3.
185. See id. at 1, 3.
186. FDA Response to Mylan Citizen Petition, supra note 37, at 13.
187. Id. at 2.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 6.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 12.
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term. 193 The FDA argued that competition from authorized generics during
"the 180-day exclusivity period furthers the Hatch-Waxman objective of
competition enhancing overall among drug products."' 94 Lastly, the FDA
stated that "[i]f 180-day exclusivity were the sole incentive for ANDA
submission, FDA would presumably not see, as we do, second, third, and
fourth ANDAs filed by generic companies that are aware that they are not
first to file an ANDA application.., and cannot gain 180-day exclusivity."'
' 95
After its citizen petition was denied, 96 Mylan filed a suit against the FDA
in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia., 97 This
suit was later dropped because Mylan believed that "additional potential
claims may be available." '1 98 Mylan has since refiled its complaint with
additional antitrust claims.'
99
C. Both Mylan and the FDA are Partially Correct in Their Arguments For
and Against Authorized Generics
Mylan argued that brand name manufacturers who market authorized
generics through a licensee are essentially acting like generic manufacturers.
This argument is supported by the fact that brand name manufacturers are
also often waiting until the first ANDA applicant actually markets the20
generic version before they market their authorized generic. Because of
this, Mylan argued that Proctor & Gamble should have to wait until the end
of Mylan's exclusivity period before it can market its authorized generic, as
this result would be consistent with the purposes the Hatch-Waxman Act.
20 1
The problem with Mylan's position, as the FDA correctly stated in its
rejection of Mylan's petition on July 2 , 2004, is that the FDA does not have
the power to regulate competition. 202 The FDA only has the authority to
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 13.
196. Id.
197. Mylan Sues Over Authorized Generics Citing Antitrust Violations, supra note 51.
198. Id.
199. Mylan Sues Over Authorized Generics Citing Antitrust Violations, supra note 55.
200. See Mylan Citizen Petition, supra note 37, at 2; Catherine Hollingsworth, FDA to
Consider Ways to Implement Recently Enacted Hatch- Waxman Reforms,
PHARMACEUTICAL L. & AND INDUSTRY REP. (Mar. 5, 2004), available at
http://subscript.bna.com/SAMPLES/plp.nsf/0/12a29041 c35I a03e85256e4d007bd9l e?Op
enDocument (citing the "trend toward authorized generics just prior to the exclusivity
period and essentially trumping the 180-day provision").
201. Mylan Citizen Petition, supra note 37, at 2.
202. FDA Response to Mylan Citizen Petition, supra note 37, at 2.
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regulate the safety and efficacy of new drugs for the public health and
welfare. 203  Since the FDA has already approved the brand name
manufacturer's new drug application, thus approving the safety and efficacy
of the new drug, public health and welfare is not harmed by the brand name
manufacturer marketing its patented drug at a generic price.
In addition, because nothing in the Hatch-Waxman Act or in its legislative
history speaks to the practice of marketing authorized generics, the FDA
does not have any guidance from the Act or any legislative history indicating
how to deal with authorized generics. Therefore, as Proctor & Gamble's
attorney argued, "Mylan's beef is really with Congress."
20 4
Recently, a federal court has gone even further than this proposition,
stating that the statute is clear and unambiguous in that the market
exclusivity provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act only apply to ANDA
20520applications, not NDA applications. Using a Chevron analysis, 2° 6 the
court stated that the plain language of the Hatch-Waxman Act is clear
because "the statute only prohibits the FDA from approving subsequent
ANDAs until after the 180 day exclusivity period has expired." The court
further stated that nothing in the statute supports the argument "that the FDA
can prohibit [brand name manufacturers] from entering the market with [an
authorized generic] during the exclusivity period., 20 8
In this case, Teva brought suit against the FDA after its citizen petition, in
which Teva requested that the FDA prohibit brand name manufacturers from
marketing authorized generics during the 180-day exclusivity period for
generics, was rejected by the FDA.2°' Teva, like Mylan in its citizen petition
with the FDA, argued that the marketing of authorized generics during the
first generic manufacturer's exclusivity period was contrary to the intent of
203. Id.
204. Smith, supra note 6.
205. Teva Pharm., Indus. v. FDA, 355 F.Supp. 2d 111, 117 (D.D.C. 2004).
206. See id. at 116-17; see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467
U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). Under the two-step Chevron analysis of an agency's
determination, the court must first look at the statute to see if Congress directly spoke on
the issue. If Congress did, then the court must give effect to the intent of Congress. Teva,
355 F. Supp. 2d at 117. If Congress has not spoken on the issue, and the statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to that issue, then the court must determine whether the
agency's determination is a "permissible construction" of the statute. Id.
207. Teva, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 117.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 114-15. Teva's original citizen petition was for the drug Accupril. The
Accupril petition was rejected by the FDA, but Teva took no action. Instead, Teva
brought suit against the FDA to challenge the FDA's decision on the Accupril petition as
it pertained to another Teva drug, Neurotin. Id.
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the Hatch-Waxman Act. 2 1 In finding for the FDA, the court found that the
plain meaning of the statute is clear in that it "unambiguously on its face
applies only to ANDA applications, not NDA applications ' 2 11 then
deference should be given to the FDA's interpretation of the statute.
212
Therefore, the court held that the FDA's decision to allow the marketing of
authorized generics was consistent with the statute.21
3
Not only did the FDA correctly state that it does not have the authority to
regulate competition, but the FDA correctly noted that one of the main
purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to put cheaper drugs on the
214
market. Marketing authorized generics helps serve this purpose by having
two or more cheaper alternatives to the brand name drug from which
consumers may choose. 2 15 The absence of any guidance in the statute or
legislative history on the issue of brand name manufacturers marketing their
own generics does not necessarily mean that Congress did not anticipate this
practice. Congress amended the Hatch-Waxman Act in 2003, and still there
is nothing in the statute that speaks to this practice. 2 16 As one court has
interpreted the Hatch-Waxman Act, the fact that nothing in the statute
speaks to the practice implies that authorized generics is not necessarily
inconsistent with the intent of Congress. 217 In addition, because the practice
of authorized generics increases the amount of cheaper alternatives to the
brand name drugs, it is possible that Congress would condone this practice
because it is consistent with the Hatch-Waxman Act's purpose.
218
On the other hand, however, another major purpose of the Hatch-Waxman
Act was "to encourage generic manufacturers to challenge pioneer patent
rights.' 2 19 This incentive is rewarded through the Act's market exclusivity
provisions for generic ANDA applicants. 2 2  The first generic ANDA
210. Id. at 115. Teva's arguments will not be addressed in this paper, because they are
similar to Mylan's arguments against authorized generics, which have already been
described.
211. Id. at 117.
212. Id. at 118-19.
213. Id. at 118.
214. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2686.
215. Sandoz Urges Generics Industry to Stop Fighting "Authorized Generics ", FDA
WEEK, Oct. 1, 2004, at 2, available at 2004 WL 78295139.
216. See Vicki Smith, Associated Press, P&G Targeted in Generic Drug Suit:
Authorized Brands Seen as a Threat, CINCINNATI POST ONLINE EDITION, Aug. 30, 2004,
http://www.cincypost.com/2004/08/30/generO83004.html.
217. See Teva Pharm., Indus. v. FDA, 355 F.Supp. 2d 111, 117 (D.D.C. 2004).
218. See FDA Response to Mylan Citizen Petition, supra note 37, at 12.
219. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 7, at page 586.
220. Id.
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applicant is given a 180-day exclusivity period to market their generic
version of the pioneer drug. 221 The Generic Pharmaceutical Association
("GPhA") has argued that if brand name manufacturers are able to market
their own generic drugs through the practice of authorized generics, this
reduces the incentive for generic manufacturers to challenge weak and
questionable patents.222  "Authorized generics devalue the exclusivity
provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act" by reducing the incentive to
challenge invalid patents.
223
Both Congress and the courts have placed significant value on the 180-
day exclusivity period and the commercial marketing trigger for this
224
exclusivity period. In Mova, the court rejected the FDA's requirement
that the first generic ANDA applicant had to successfully defend against a
225patent infringement suit in order to trigger the 180-day exclusivity period.
The court held to the literal language of the statute in that this exclusivity
period began to run as soon as the generic ANDA applicant began to
commercially market the drug.226 In addition, Congress deleted the "court
decision" trigger in its 2003 amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act leaving
"commercial marketing" as the only trigger of the 180-day exclusivity
227period. Therefore, both Congress and the courts have not wanted to
reduce or devalue the incentive for generic manufacturers to challenge weak
or invalid patents as they have taken away many restrictions, both statutory
and regulatory, to maintain this incentive.
Authorized generics reduce the incentive for generic ANDA applicants to
challenge pioneer patents because it devalues the 180-day exclusivity period
for generic ANDA applicants. 228 This is because a generic manufacturer
"has to be able to get a certain percentage of the market to come into the
market at all.,, 229 Although authorized generics do bring another cheaper
alternative to the market in addition to the generic version of the pioneer
drug, the GPhA has argued that "[a]uthorized generics in the long term could
221. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(2000).
222. Agency Views on Authorized Generics a Boon to Brands, WASH. DRUG LETrER,
Oct. 11, 2004, at 9, available at 2004 WL 64192667.
223. Id.
224. See generally Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998);
see also Lietzan, supra note 12, at 310.
225. Mova, 140 F.3d at 1076.
226. Id. at 1071-72.
227. Lietzan, supra note 12, at 310.
228. Mylan Citizen Petition, supra note 37, at 2; see also Agency Views on Authorized
Generics a Boon to Brands, WASH. DRUG LETrER, Oct. 11, 2004, at 9, available at 2004
WL 64192667.
229. Niles, supra note 39, at 57 (quoting Joseph R. Robinson, Principal, Darby &
Darby).
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result in generic companies undertaking fewer patent challenges, which
would result in higher drug costs for American consumers. ' 23° Therefore,
authorized generics do have some anticompetitive effects, contrary to the
FDA's opinion, which may be inconsistent with the Hatch-Waxman
Act's purpose of promoting competition from generic manufacturers. In
addition, brand name manufacturers have not hidden their intent to prevent
generic competition as many wait until the first ANDA applicant actually
markets the generic version before they market their authorized generic.232
It is no surprise that a brand name manufacturer waits until the first generic
manufacturer with market exclusivity comes to market, because "[d]uring
the exclusivity period, generic drugs generally are priced at about 30 percent
less than the branded drug."
233
III. THE "GAPING BLACK HOLE"
Both Mylan and the FDA are partially correct in their arguments for and
against authorized generics. The Hatch-Waxman Act does not give any
specific guidance to the interpretative issue of authorized generics as it
relates to a generic manufacturer's ability to compete with brand name
234manufacturers through the Act's 180-day exclusivity provision. Indeed,
as the statute stands, the market exclusivity provisions only apply to generic
235manufacturers. In addition, the legislative history for the ANDA process
236
and the 180-day exclusivity provisions is limited. The issue of authorized
generics has exposed a gaping black hole in the Hatch-Waxman Act that the
FDA and courts have no ability to close.
The FDA was correct in its rejection of Mylan's citizen petition. The
FDA does not have the power to regulate competition as an agency, nor
under the Hatch-Waxman Act.237  The FDA only has the authority to
regulate issues of public health and welfare, and a brand name
manufacturer's marketing its own, already-approved drug at a lower price
230. Authorized Generic Drugs a Brand Windfall, GPhA Says, GENERIC LINE, Oct. 6,
2004, 2, available at 2004 WL 65711636.
231. FDA Response to Mylan Citizen Petition, supra note 37, at 12.
232. Id. at 2; Hollingsworth, supra note 200.
233. Michelle L. Kirsche, As Brand-Generic Alliances Grow, Opponents Cry Foul,
DRUG STORE NEWS, Aug. 23, 2004, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/
mi m3374/is_10 26/ai n6197200.
234. See Smith, supra note 216.
235. Teva Pharm., Indus., v. FDA, 355 F. Supp. 2d 111, 117 (D.D.C. 2004).
236. Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
237. See FDA Response to Mylan Citizen Petition, supra note 37, at 2-3.
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does not harm the public health and welfare.238  In addition, the Hatch-
Waxman Act does not provide authority for the FDA to prevent brand name
manufacturers from marketing authorized generics. 239  The FDA cannot
write provisions into the statute, 4 and it has no guidance from the statute or
its legislative history to write rules to regulate authorized generics. 24 1 As a
result, Mylan's argument that the FDA should create a separate approval
process for authorized generics has no authority.
Courts also cannot effectively address this problem, because the Hatch-
Waxman Act is silent on the practice of marketing authorized generics and
the exclusivity provisions only apply to generic manufacturers who have
242
submitted ANDA applications. The market exclusivity provisions only
prohibit other generic manufacturers, who file paragraph IV ANDAs after
the first-filing generic manufacturer, from marketing their generic versions
243during the first-filing generic manufacturer's exclusivity period. The
market exclusivity provisions do not prohibit brand name manufacturers
244from marketing authorized generics during the exclusivity period.
Therefore, because nothing in the statute speaks to the practice, courts
cannot effectively deal with this issue. They cannot enact provisions to fill
this hole in the statute.
Although the FDA correctly dismissed Mylan's citizen petition, the
FDA's argument that the practice of marketing authorized generics furthers
Congress' intent of promoting competition is weak. Marketing authorized
generics, the FDA argued, brings additional cheaper alternatives to the
245
market for consumers. Although one major purpose of the Hatch-
Waxman Act was to bring cheaper drugs to the market,246 the effect of
authorized generics is contrary to the intent of Congress, because brand
name manufacturers are marketing authorized generics in order to prevent
238. See id.
239. Teva, 355 F. Supp. 2d, at 117. "Nothing in the statute provides any support for
the argument that the FDA can prohibit NDA holders from entering the market with a
brand generic drug during the exclusivity period." Id.
240. See STEPHEN G. BREYER, RICHARD B. STEWART, CASS R. SUNsTEIN, & MATTHEW
L. SPITZER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY, § 2.C., at 43 (5th ed. 2002)
(stating that "[b]y vesting all 'legislative powers' in 'a Congress of the United States,' the
Constitution seems to create a nondelegation doctrine"); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § I
("all legislative powers... shall be vested in a Congress of the United States").
241. Lietzan, supra note 12, at 293.
242. Id. at 118.
243. Id. at 288; see also Balto, supra note 20, at 331.
244. See Teva Pharm., Indus., LTD v. FDA, 355 F. Supp. 2d 111, 117 (D.D.C. 2004).
245. See FDA Response to Mylan Citizen Petition, supra note 37, at 12.
246. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2686.
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cheaper drugs from entering the market. 247 Brand name manufacturers are
marketing authorized generics in order to prevent competition from the
generic applicant entitled to market exclusivity. 248  Brand name
manufacturers often try to prevent this competition by only marketing their
authorized generics when the generic ANDA applicants first begin to
commercially market their generic versions.
249
In addition to the anticompetitive effects of authorized generics, this
practice is also contrary to another major purpose of the Hatch-Waxman
Act, namely to encourage generic manufacturers to challenge pioneer
patents.2as  Because marketing authorized generics devalues the 180-day
exclusivity period for the first generic ANDA applicant, it reduces the
incentive to challenge pioneer patents.2 1
Congress and courts have placed significant value on the 180-day
exclusivity period and the commercial marketing trigger for this period of
exclusivity. 252  The courts have removed the "successful defense" and
"involvement in apatent infringement suit" requirements for approval of a
,2531,
generic's ANDA. In addition, Congress practically eliminated the "court
decision" trigger in the Medicare Act of 2003, keeping the "commercial
marketing" trigger as the primary trigger for the 180-day period of market
exclusivity. 254 Therefore, both Congress and the courts have made sure that
the right to market exclusivity has not been impeded in order to maintain the
incentive for generic manufacturers to challenge the patents of pioneer
drugs.
Furthermore, Congress, the FDA, and courts have tried to curb attempts
by brand name manufacturers to prevent generic competition. In the
Medicare Act of 2003, Congress attempted to curb some of these abuses by
allowing only one thirty-month automatic stay per ANDA and enacting
substantial forfeiture provisions for a generic manufacturer's failure to come
to market.
255
Brand name manufacturers have been marketing authorized generics as a
new scheme to prevent generic competition. They have employed this
247. See Mylan Citizen Petition, supra note 37, at 2.
248. See id.
249. Id.
250. See Smith, supra note 6.
251. Authorized Generic Drugs a Brand Windfall, GPhA Says, supra note 230.
252. See Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see
also Lietzan, supra note 12, at 310.
253. See Mova, 140 F.3d 1060, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Purepac Pharm. Co. v.
Friedman, 162 F.3d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
254. Lietzan, supra note 12, at 310.
255. See Apotex, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 187, 189-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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practice to regain the market share that is taken away by generic
manufacturers through the 180-day exclusivity period. However, the FDA,
as stated above, does not have the authority to regulate competition. In
addition, the Hatch-Waxman Act does not account for the practice of
authorized generics by brand name manufacturers during the first-filing
generic manufacturer's market exclusivity period, as the market exclusivity
provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act only apply to generic manufacturers
who have filed paragraph IV ANDAs. 6 Congress needs to amend the
Hatch-Waxman Act to account for the practice of authorized generics and to
make changes in order to serve the purpose and intent of the original Act.
Although brand name manufacturers should not be completely prohibited
from marketing authorized generics, they should not be able to employ this
practice during the exclusivity period in order to prevent generic
competition. They should have to wait until the exclusivity period is over,
and other generic manufacturers begin to market their generic versions. As
it stands now, the practice completely devalues the incentive for generic
manufacturers to challenge listed patents through the ANDA process.
"Authorized generics are the biggest threat to the generic industry
today[,]' 257 and if Congress does not address the issue, then it could result in
higher drug costs for consumers in the long run if fewer generic
258
manufacturers undertake patent challenges.
CONCLUSION
Congress did not account for authorized generics when it passed the
Hatch-Waxman Act, and it has not accounted for this practice during the
Act's twenty-year lifespan. The FDA was correct in rejecting Mylan's
citizen petition on this issue, as the FDA does not have the power to regulate
competition. In addition, the Hatch-Waxman Act gives no specific guidance
for the FDA or courts in terms of how to properly address the issue of
authorized generics. Mylan's "beef' is with Congress, and it is up to
Congress to fix the gaping black hole in the Act.
256. See Teva Pharms., Indus., LTD v. FDA, 355 F. Supp. 2d 111, 117 (D.D.C.
2004).
257. Kirsche, supra note 233.
258. Authorized Generic Drugs a Brand Windfall, GPhA Says, supra note 230.
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